In order to successfully perform a task, a situated system requires some information about its domain. If we can understand what information the system requires, we may be able to equip it with more suitable sensors or make better use of the information available to it. These considerations have motivated roboticists to examine the issue of sensor design, and in particular, the minimal information required to perform a task. We show here that reasoning in terms of what the robot knows and needs to know to perform a task is a useful approach for analyzing these issues. We extend the formal framework for reasoning about knowledge, already used in AI and distributed computing, by developing a set of basic concepts and tools for modeling and analyzing the knowledge requirements of tasks. We investigate properties of the resulting framework, and show how it can be applied to robotics tasks.
Introduction
The notion of computational complexity has had a profound e ect on the development of computer science. While imperfect, our ability to classify di erent computational problems in terms of their complexity allows us to understand inherent di culties in solving such problems. Thus, when a problem can be solved or approximately solved in polynomial time, we can concentrate on improving algorithms for its solution. Conversely, when a problem is shown to be a member of (what is believed to be) a more di cult class such as the class of NP-complete problems, we know that we must look for heuristics and simplifying assumptions when confronting this problem.
Some areas of robotics have bene ted from advances in computational complexity. This is true primarily of certain stylized robotics problems, such as variants of robot motionplanning (e.g., Can89, RS85, Rei79] ). However, the area of robotics as a whole still lacks the analog of a Turing machine, a formal device that faithfully quanti es the di culty of a robotic task or the capabilities of a robot. 1 The reason for this is that usually space and time complexity are not the dominating factors in a robotic task. Rather, issues such as the sloppiness of controllers, the imprecision of sensors, and the need for communication between spatially separated components assume major importance. This suggests that a good model for robotics should revolve around the notions of information and uncertainty. Similar points have also been made by Erdmann Erd94] and Donald Don94] .
We propose a formal framework to capture these notions, closely based on that of FHMV95], which makes use of a formal notion of knowledge. We believe that reasoning in terms of knowledge can form the basis for a general model of informational aspects of robots and robotic tasks. In our framework, robotic tasks can be characterized in terms of the knowledge required to perform them, and robots can be characterized in terms of the knowledge they can acquire. We can therefore assess the ability of a particular robot to perform a task by comparing its knowledge capabilities to the knowledge requirements of the task. This is reminiscent of the use of knowledge in distributed systems to characterize the information needed to perform tasks such as coordinated attack HM90].
In the coordinated attack problem and other problems of coordination and agreement, it turns out that common knowledge|the state where everyone knows that everyone knows that everyone knows : : : |plays a crucial role. It is, in a precise sense, a necessary and su cient condition for coordination and agreement FHMV95, HM90] . Moreover, the knowledge before common knowledge is attained is irrelevant; all that matters is that common knowledge is eventually attained. In a certain important class of tasks that we consider here, which we refer to as manipulation tasks, we can say even more. The goal in a manipulation task is to move an object from some initial con guration to a goal con guration. These are the types of tasks discussed in the motion-planning literature Erd94, Lat91] . In a manipulation task, we can typically nd a set of propositional formulas such that, if the agent knows one of these formulas at every step, then the task can be performed and, moreover, (if the agent has appropriate sensors) it is possible for the agent always to know one of these conditions. Intuitively, each of these tests identi es a set of con gurations for which a particular transition exists which would reduce the distance, according to some distance measure, of the system's con guration from the goal. This is essentially the approach taken by Erdmann Erd94] . As we shall see, thinking in terms of knowledge gives us a highlevel tool to clarify what is going on. We illustrate this point by applying our ideas to a maze-searching example originally analyzed by Blum and Kozen BK78] ; see Section 4.
To provide intuition, throughout this paper we will anchor the formal development in the following example. Although simple, the example embodies two important ingredients| imprecise sensing, and the need to coordinate the actions of spatially distributed actuators. Example 1.1: Two horizontal, perpendicular, one-dimensional robotic arms must coordinate as follows. The rst arm must push a hot object lengthwise across the table until the Figure 1: The two-arm system second arm is able to push it sideways so that it falls into a cooling bin. The length of the table is marked in feet, from 0 through 10 (for simplicity we ignore the vertical coordinate). The object is initially placed at position 0 on the table. The second arm is able to push the object if it is anywhere in the region 3,7]. 2 The second arm cannot hit the object while it is pushed by the rst arm, since this will cause the mechanism to jam; on the other hand, the object cannot remain motionless for more than an instant or it will burn a hole into the table. Thus, the second arm must move precisely when the rst one stops. This setup is illustrated in Figure 1 . We consider two variants of the problem:
1.1a. The arms share a controller. The controller has access to a sensor reporting the position of the object with error no greater than 1, i.e., if the object's current location is q then the reading can be anywhere in q ? 1; q + 1].
1.1b. Same as 1.1a, except the error bound is 4 rather than 1. It is not hard to see that in case 1.1b, there is no protocol that performs the task, whereas in cases 1.1a, there is. For example, a centralized protocol that deals with 1.1a is the following (where r is the current reading):
if r 4 then Move(arm 1 ) else Move(arm 2 ). Example 1.1 illustrates the need to analyze several basic issues, such as how much information the controller needs in order to perform this task and what information each controller is capable of obtaining. These are the types of issues we consider in this paper.
This example should make apparent that, unlike the planning perspective taken by the work of Moore Moo85] and Morgenstern Mor87] on knowledge, actions, and plans, we take a design perspective. It is not our goal to provide knowledge representation tools for an agent that reasons about its knowledge during the course of its planning activities. Rather, we provide a set of concepts that can aid in the process of designing a situated system that can perform some given set of tasks. To use the analogy of computational complexity, we are not considering the task of building agents that must gure out how to solve a particular computational problem; rather, we attempt to provide tools by which a designer could characterize the resources needed by a program that solves this problem. Although both problems are related at some abstract level, di erent models, assumptions, concepts, and languages are appropriate in each case. We shall have more to say on this issue in our discussion of related work (Section 5).
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In the next section, we describe the view we take in modeling tasks, agents, and their information requirements. In Section 3, we use the concept of knowledge to de ne measures of information requirements of tasks and information capabilities of agents, and we show some relations that exist among these measures. In Section 4, we continue with this development, supplying a number of additional tools, such as control variables and learning. We illustrate these tools with the problem of maze searching. We discuss related work in Section 5, and conclude in Section 6 with some directions for further work.
The Basic Model
In this section, we describe a basic model of an agent embedded in an environment in which it must act. We start with an overview of our perspective and our aims, an understanding of which will help the reader understand the development of this paper and our technical choices in the rest of this paper. We then formalize these ideas.
An Overview of our Approach
To investigate issues such as the information complexity of tasks and information-attaining capabilities of agents, we must rst make the notion of a task more precise. Tasks are de ned in some context; for example, the task of getting a robot from point A to point B is de ned in the context of some physical environment in which the robot's motions take place; the task of rearranging the furniture in a room is de ned in the context of some room description, some description of the furniture, their initial positions, and their desired nal positions. More abstractly, a task is de ned in the context of some set of possible con gurations of the system of interest, called its con guration space. A typical task might involve taking a system from some initial con guration to some goal con guration, while making sure that the system's con guration always satis es certain conditions. Such a task can be described abstractly in terms of sets of acceptable sequences of con gurations, or in the continuous case, acceptable functions from 0; 1) to con gurations. For example, the task of getting from an initial con guration c 0 to some goal con guration c f can be de ned as the set of sequences of con gurations in which c 0 appears rst and c f appears last. Or, using in nite sequences (as we do in this paper), this task corresponds to the set of sequences which start with c 0 and stabilize at c f from some point on.
So far, we have said nothing about how the task is to be performed, that is, how we get from the initial to the nal con guration. We abstract away from this issue here, and simply assume that there is a xed set of changes, or transitions, that an agent can e ect. Our goal is to understand what information an agent capable of these transitions needs in order to perform its task. This, in turn, a ects the design of the agent's information-gathering capabilities, such as its sensors and communication channels.
To summarize, we are given (1) a set of possible con gurations for a system, (2) a set of sequences of con gurations de ning the task, and (3) a set of allowed transitions de ning the changes that can be made to the system's con guration at each point in time. We must supply the agent with the information necessary to perform its task, and a program that uses this information appropriately. As we shall see, using a formal notion of knowledge, we can analyze the information needs of a task, and provide guidelines for the design of the agent's sensory apparatus at an abstract, yet useful level.
The view developed here was strongly in uenced by three sources. Erdmann's discussion of abstract sensors Erd94], which explicitly examines the issue of sensor design, led us to consider many of the issues discussed in this paper and motivated our choice of semantics. Donald's work on information invariants Don94], which provides a framework for comparing and evaluating sensor systems, led us to examine the ideas of task and sensor complexity. Finally, the framework for knowledge in multi-agent systems developed in FHMV95] provides a natural tool for capturing and formalizing these ideas, especially given its past use in establishing lower bounds on message transmission and other resources required for performing tasks in distributed systems (see, for example, HM90, CM86]). Indeed, Erdmann's semantics of abstract sensors leads naturally to the concept of knowledge. Our major contribution is the formalization and further development of these ideas in the context of robotics. We discuss the connection between our work and these other papers in more detail in Section 5.
In the remainder of this section, we present enough background to make the technical development in the paper self contained.
The Model
Our formal model is based on the notion of system, as de ned in FHMV95], with modications appropriate for our context. We start by de ning the space in which agents act and a set of possible transitions on that space. We shall con ne ourselves to discrete domains. While a knowledge-level analysis can be carried out in continuous domains, (e.g., see BLMS97]), the technical issues raised by continuous domains would needlessly complicate this exposition.
De nition 2.1: Let E be the environment's set of states, also referred to as the con guration space. The set of transitions over E consists of functions from E to 2 E n;. We assume that the identity mapping Id is contained in .
A task is simply a set of a sequences of con gurations, which we call C-histories. One can view the C-histories de ning a task as the set of desirable behaviors.
De nition 2.2: A C-history C (over E) is an in nite sequence of con gurations in E. We use C(n) (n 0) to denote the n th element of this sequence. A task (over E) is a set of C-histories (over E).
An agent is de ned in the context of a xed environment E and a set of possible transitions. The state of the environment, or the con guration, describes the state of the external world, i.e., all the relevant aspects of the world not belonging to the robot's internal state. This is the world which the agent is to manipulate. The agent itself has a set of local states and actions, where each action transforms the local state of the agent and the external state of the world. These actions need not be deterministic, and it is possible for an action to change only the local state of the agent, as, in fact, is the case for sensing actions. We make two requirements. The rst is that the e ects of an action on the environment depend only on the current state of the environment. This guarantees that the local state of the agent represents only its internal state. The second is that the e ects an action can have on the environment conform to the set of possible transitions. Hence, agents de ned have the same abilities to transform the state of the external world (environment); they di er only in the structure of their local states (that is, in the information that they have) and in the e ect of actions on these local states. Although the actions \implement" a xed set of transitions, actions implementing the same transition may have di erent e ects on each agent's local state. We note that although we often refer to an agent as a \robot," there is no requirement that its sensors and e ectors make for a contiguous piece of equipment or that they are otherwise related to one another.
As the discussion above suggests, we assume that agents have local states. The global state of the system is a pair consisting of the con guration and the agent's local state.
De nition 2.3: If E is the set of con gurations and L is the set of local states, then G = E L is the set of global states (based on E and L). De nition 2.4: An agent A situated in (E; ) is a pair (L; Actions), where L is the set of local states of the agent, and Actions is a set of functions from G = E L to 2 G n; satisfying the following conditions:
1. For all a 2 Actions, c 2 E, and l; l 0 2 L, we have proj con g (a(c; l)) = proj con g (a(c; l 0 )). 2. For a 2 Actions, let a be the transition de ned by a (c) def = proj con g (a(c; l)) for some l 2 L.
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Then for all a 2 Actions, we must have a 2 . Moreover, for all 2 , there exists some a 2 Actions such that = a . We call a the transition induced by a 2 Actions.
From now on, we assume we are working with a xed con guration space E and set of possible transitions. All agents discussed will be situated in (E; ). Therefore, all agents we discuss have the same physical capabilities but may di er in their information-attaining capabilities. 3 The choice of the local state in the de nition of a is inconsequential because for all l; l 0 2 L we require that proj con g (a(c; l)) = proj con g (a(c; l 0 )).
Example 2.5: The con guration space for example 1.1a consists of all possible positions of the hot object: E = 0; 10] fTable;Bing. 4 The set of possible transitions, consists of Move(arm 1 ), Move(arm 2 ), and the identity mapping, where Move(arm 1 ) transforms (q; x) to (q + 1; x) when x = De nition 2.6: A run is a function r from N (the natural numbers) to the set of global states G. A run r is consistent with respect to agent A = (L; Actions) if for every n 2 N, it is the case that r(n + 1) 2 a(r(n)) for some a 2 Actions. A system is a set of runs.
According to this de nition, we are identifying a system with its possible behaviors. Typically, systems are generated by protocols.
De nition 2.7: A protocol for an agent A = (L; Actions) is a function P : L ! 2 Actions n ;. A run r is an execution of a protocol P if for every n 2 N it is the case that r(n + 1) 2 P(proj local (r(n)))(r(n)). If I G is a set of (initial) global states, then the system R I; A] consists of every run r consistent with respect to A such that r(0) 2 I. If P is a protocol for A, then system R I; A;P] consists of every execution r of P by A such that r(0) 2 I.
A protocol describes the agent's program, allowing for non-deterministic behavior whenever more than one action is assigned at a local state. Its executions are the set of runs in which the agent's action at each point is consistent with the assignment of the protocol.
Finally, we say that an agent can perform a task if it has a protocol all of whose executions are in the task.
De nition 2.8: A protocol P for agent A performs Task from I if proj con g (R I; A;P])
Task. An agent can perform Task from I if it has a protocol that performs Task from I. Example 2.9: Consider Example 1.1a, and let I = f((0; Table) ;0)g. The system I I; A] consists of all runs starting in I in which the object is moved forward for some number of steps (possibly 0) and is eventually moved to the cooling bin. At all points, the local state indicates the current position with an error no greater than 1. In addition, this system contains all runs in which the object reaches position (10, Table) and remains there forever, with similar constraints on the local state.
Let protocol P assign the action Move 1 when the controller's local state is in 0; 3] 7; 10] and Move 2 when its local state is in 4; 6]. The system R I; A;P] consists of all runs in which the object moves forward until a reading in 4; 6] occurs for the rst time. Given the above restrictions on sensing error, this could be anywhere in 3; 5]. At this point the object is pushed to the cooling bin. Since all such runs are in Task rob , P performs Task rob .
A Language for Reasoning about Knowledge
Having set up a model, we would like to have a formal language that will allow us to express properties of particular systems. Epistemic logic, introduced by Hintikka Hin62], provides a particularly suitable tool for this purpose. We start with set of primitive propositions. We can think of these primitive propositions as statements like \the robot is at position 2" or \the temperature is high". The language L contains , and is closed under the standard boolean connectives and the knowledge operator K. Thus, if 1 and 2 are formulas, then so are 1^ 2 , : , and K . We want to assign truth values to formulas in L at points in some system R, where a point is a pair (r; m), consisting of a run r and a time m. To do this, we rst need a way of deciding when the primitive propositions in are true. Given a set G of global states, an interpretation function over G assigns to each proposition p 2 a truth value at each global state in G. A pair I = (R; ) consisting of a system R of runs over set G and an interpretation over G is called an interpreted system. In an interpreted system, we can de ne the semantics of propositional formulas in a straightforward way. Intuitively, a formula of the form K is true at a point (r; m) if ' is true at all points (r 0 ; m 0 ) that the agent cannot distinguish from (r; m). An agent cannot distinguish two points if it has the same local state in both. It is easy to check that whether I;r;m j = depends only on the global state r(m); that is, if r 0 (m 0 ) = r(m), then for all formulas , we have I;r;m j = i I;r 0 ; m 0 j = . Thus, if s is a global state, we often abuse notation and write I;s j = . (We remark that this would not be true if we used a richer language that included explicit temporal operators.) Moreover, whether a formula of the form K is true depends only on the agent's local state.
Thus, we further abuse notation and write I;l j = K i , if l is a local state. This notation emphasizes the fact that the knowledge operator allows us to express correlations between the local state of the agent and the external world. Finally, we assume for the rest of this paper that the interpretation function depends only on the con guration component of the global state. That is, for all propositions p, if the system's con guration in s and s 0 are the same, then (s; p) = (s 0 ; p). This is reasonable for our intended applications, since tasks are de ned in terms of the external world only. Thus, for a propositional formula (one with no occurrences of the modal operator K), we often abuse notation and write I;c j = , where c is a con guration.
For the remainder of the paper, x an interpretation function that depends only on the con guration. We use I I; A] and I I; A;P] to denote the interpreted system (R I; A]; ) and (R I; A;P]; ), respectively. We write I j = if I;r;m j = for every point (r; m) in I.
3 Knowledge as an Analysis and Speci cation Tool
Skeletal Knowledge-Based Programs
Work in distributed systems has shown that the formal notion of knowledge is a powerful tool for analyzing traditional protocols. Knowledge is also useful for design purposes too; it allows one to design high-level protocols, called knowledge-based programs : : : if K n then n ;
Each condition of the case statement is a test on the knowledge of the agent. The interpretation of this protocol is that the agent non-deterministically performs an action that implements the transition corresponding to a condition that is satis ed.
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We refer to K 1 ; : : : ; K n as the (knowledge) conditions of this SKBP. If i is a propositional formula (i.e., it contains no occurrences of the K operator), we call K i positive. In the remainder of this paper, we restrict our attention to positive SKBPs. The fact that we do not allow nested K's is not a serious restriction in the case of a single agent|every formula can be denested so that there are no nested K's HC68, p.50]. However, the fact that we do not allow tests of the form :K , which means that an agent cannot perform an action based on lack of knowledge, is a nontrivial restriction in some applications. We return to this issue when we discuss learning in Section 4.2. Nevertheless, as we shall see, positive SKBPs still allow us to capture many intuitions of interest for our intended application. Moreover, the restriction to positivity makes it much easier to capture the notion of knowledge complexity, de ned in Section 3.2.
Intuitively, a protocol P for agent A implements Pg = f(K i ; i ) j i = 1; : : : ; ng if, at every local state l in which the agent's knowledge is K i , P assigns an action a that implements i . However, recall that an agent's knowledge in a local state is de ned with respect to some system that determines its set of possible worlds. Hence, in order to determine which local states should be substituted for each knowledge condition, we must rst specify the system with respect to which the agent's knowledge is de ned. Formally, we adopt a semantics similar to that of FHMV95] for knowledge-based programs, modi ed so as to handle our use of transitions rather than actions. Our notion of implementation leads to a natural notion of correctness: an SKBP is correct if all protocols consistent with it satisfy the given task. This notion is referred to as strong correctness in FHMV95]. Adapting their de nitions to our presentation, we would say that P represents Pg if P(l) = Pg I I;A;P] (l), and that P is consistent with Pg if P(l) Pg I I;A;P] (l). Notice that the set of protocols consistent with an SKBP Pg is (in general a strict) superset of the protocols that represent Pg. Moreover, a protocol consistent with a given SKBP is guaranteed to exist (see Lemma A.1), although there may not be any protocol that represents it FHMV95]. We have de ned implementation in terms of consistency, rather than representation, because, in our context, strong correctness seems more appropriate than just requiring that all protocols that represent the SKBP satisfy the task. We are willing to accept a protocol as long as its behaviors are compatible with the SKBP, even if it does not generate all the behaviors of the SKBP.
In this paper, we are interested in a particular class of implementations of skeletal knowledge-based programs.
De nition 3.4: Protocol P for agent A is a good implementation of Pg from I if I I; A;P] j = K 1 _ _ K n , where K 1 ; : : : ; K n are the knowledge conditions of Pg.
By restricting our attention to the good implementations of SKBPs, we transform SKBPs from abstract program speci cations to abstract knowledge speci cations. Now, a skeletal knowledge-based program not only speci es what an agent should do, via the notions of standard translations and implementations, it also speci es a class of agents that are quali ed to execute this speci cation. These agents have an implementation of the SKBP in which they always know enough so that one of the tests for knowledge holds at every global state. The importance of this property will become clearer when we present our de nition of upper bound on the knowledge complexity of a task. From now on, unless otherwise noted, by an implementation of a SKBP Pg, we always mean a good implementation.
Note that an agent may have a good implementation of an SKBP with conditions K' 1 ; : : :; K' k even though it can reach local states in I I; A] in which it knows none of the above conditions. If this happens, the SKBP must be preventing the agent from reaching such states. Intuitively, this can be due to one of two reasons: actions leading to states of relative ignorance are avoided and/or actions that lead to an increase of knowledge are taken.
The notion of performs can now be generalized to SKBPs.
De nition 3.5: A set I of global states (for agent A) is t 0 -consistent with task Task if proj con g (I) = fC(0) j C 2 Taskg. Pg performs Task if all its good implementations from every set I t 0 -consistent with Task perform Task from I, and it has a (good) implementation from some I t 0 -consistent with Task. Notice that, in de ning the notion of an SKBP Pg performing Task, we restrict attention to sets I of initial states that are t 0 -consistent with Task. Clearly, if we start Pg in an initial state that is not the initial state of some con guration in Task, it will generate an execution that is not in Task. Thus, we must restrict to initial states that are t 0 -consistent with Task in order to get a reasonable notion of implementation. Weakening the de nition of t 0 consistency by replacing set equality with set containment would lead to undesirable side-e ects. In particular, certain programs Pg that can only perform Task from restricted starting states would be considered as performing the task, despite the fact that their good implementations require excessive information about the initial state.
In practice, it may be di cult to transform an SKBP to a standard protocol. However, we believe that, as has been the case in distributed systems, using knowledge-based analysis and design gives a useful methodology by allowing us to leverage the ability of SKBPs to abstract away the idiosyncrasies of local state. Thus, for example, rather than discuss the content of the frame bu er of a robot's vision system, an SKBP allows us to talk about the robot knowing that there is an obstacle in front of it.
Knowledge Complexity
We now wish to de ne a formal concept of informational complexity of a task that can serve to quantify the amount of knowledge an agent must attain in order to perform the task. Typically, the type of statement we want to make is that an agent must eventually come to know a certain fact (or one of a set of facts) in order to perform the task. For example, in HM90], it was shown that to perform coordinated attack, the agents needed to eventually have common knowledge of the fact that at least one message was delivered.
Recall from the introduction that we are interested in manipulation tasks, where the goal is to move an object from some initial con guration to a goal con guration. We hope to nd a set of propositional formulas that can be thought of as describing sets of con gurations such that, if the agent knows one of these formulas at every step, then the task can be performed by an SKBP that uses these tests. Intuitively, moving from one set of con gurations to another gets the agent closer to its goal.
Keeping these intuitions in mind, we de ne a notion of informational upper bound appropriate for manipulation tasks.
De nition 3.6: If ' 1 ; : : : ; ' k are propositional formulas, we say that f' 1 ; : : : ; ' k g is an upper bound on the knowledge complexity of a task Task, or just Task is O(f' 1 ; : : :; ' k g), if
there exists an SKBP Pg with conditions K' 1 ; : : :; K' k that performs Task.
Notice that, in this de nition, we are implicitly assuming that there is a xed interpretation on the con guration space E, and we are restricting attention to interpreted systems I that use this interpretation. This de nition should also make it clear why we are particularly interested in good implementations of a knowledge-based program. Suppose that we require all the implementations of an SKBP Pg (including the non-good ones) to perform Task. Unless some of the conditions in Pg are tautologies, there will be an agent that does not know any of the tests of Pg at any state. This agent will have an implementation P of Pg which has an execution in which it constantly performs the identity transition. Typically, the projection of this execution will not be in Task, and under the stronger de nition, Pg would not perform Task. To avoid this problem, we restrict to good implementations. By doing so, we are, in fact, saying that an SKBP comes with some minimal requirements for its execution: the ability to know one of its knowledge conditions at each state. Of course, if we are to use sets of (propositional) formulas as a measure of knowledge complexity, we must de ne an ordering on such sets, to allow us to say when the information characterized by one set is more di cult to attain than the information characterized by another set.
De nition 3.7: Given a con guration space E, and sets A and B of propositional formulas, we say that B dominates A (with respect to E), and write A E B, if for every formula 2 B, there is a formula ' 2 A such that E j = ) '.
Notice that if A E B, then for every formula 2 B, there is a formula ' 2 A such that knowing implies knowing '. It is easy to see that E de nes a partial order (that is, a re exive, transitive relation) on sets of formulas. As the following result shows, this ordering does capture a reasonable notion of hardness. Table) g. Let r be a run of I = I f(0;Table)g;A;P]. Consider the rst time m that I;r;m j = K' 2 . Notice that there must be such a time, since A performs Move(arm 1 ) until K' 2 holds. If K' 2 never holds, then A must eventually reach position 7, at which point K' 1 cannot hold, contradicting our assumption that P is a good implementation. Our argument also shows that at the point (r; m), the con guration must be in 3; 7]. Hence, when the agent performs Move(arm 2 ), it gets into the goal region.
We can de ne a notion of lower bound that corresponds to our notion of upper bound.
De nition 3.10: We say that the set A of propositional formulas is a lower bound on the K-complexity of Task, or Task is (A), if, for every set of formulas B such that Task is O(B), we have that A E B.
Notice that ftrueg is a lower bound for the K-complexity of any task. Obviously, this lower bound does not give much insight. Ideally, we would like a tight bound: a lower bound that is also an upper bound. Unfortunately, it seems di cult to get tight bounds. For example, we can show that Task rob has no tight bound.
Proposition 3.11: There is no set A of primitive propositions such that Task rob is (A)
and O(A). Although we cannot provide a tight bound for Task rob , we might still hope to provide useful (nontrivial) lower bounds. While this can be done, we have found it more useful to use a di erent notion of lower bound, that is closer to our original intuition of the agent eventually needing to know one of a collection of facts.
Proof: Suppose Task rob is (A) and O(A)
De nition 3.12: We say that f' 1 ; : : :; ' k g is a weak lower bound on the K-complexity of Task, or Task is w (f' 1 ; : : :; ' k g), if, for every I t 0 -consistent with Task, every agent A, every protocol P for A that performs Task from I, and every run r in I I; A;P], there exists some time m such that I I; A;P];r;m j = K' 1 _ : : : _ K' n .
We can use this notion of lower bound to prove that the controller in Example 1.1b cannot perform Task rob .
Theorem 3.13: Task rob is w (fgg). Proof: Suppose that P is a protocol for agent A that performs Task rob from f(0 ;Table) Corollary 3.14: The controller in Example 1.1b cannot perform Task rob . Proof: Suppose P is a protocol for the controller of Example 1.1b that performs Task rob starting from f(0;Table)g. Since the controller's error bound is 4, its local state could be any one of 0; : : :; 4 while it is in the initial con guration (0 ; Table) . It clearly must perform the action Move(arm 1 ) when it is in the initial con guration, thus we must have P(0) = = P(4) = Move(arm 1 ). It follows that there is a run r of P in which the agent reaches (8; Table) while its local state is always in 0; 4]. Clearly, Kg cannot hold at any point in r: it cannot hold up to the time the agent reaches (8; Table) , since it does not hold in any local state in 0; 4]. It also cannot hold after the agent reaches (8; Table) , since g does not hold. It follows from Theorem 3.13 that P does not perform Task rob .
Actually although not necessarily the same one. Notice that this does not imply that the agent has the same knowledge in di erent runs or in di erent points along a single run. It may know ' 4 initially, then, after performing some action, it will know ' 7 , and forget about ' 4 . This de nition embodies the notion that sensing is nondeterministic. The robot may be able to guarantee that it will come to know one of several facts, but not any one of them in particular. For example, given a position sensor with 1 error, sensing the position when in location 4 will yield knowledge of one of the following three facts: \the location is between 2 and 4", \the location is between 3 and 5", and \the location is between 4 and 6". Yet, knowledge of any one particular statement is not guaranteed. Notice that K-capability, like our notions of upper and lower bound (and unlike the notion of weak lower bound) requires the agent to know one of ' 1 ; : : : ; ' k at every point in the system. However, this requirement We could have also de ned a notion of K-capability with respect to I and P, for a protocol P, but this does not seem to be quite so useful a notion. The following result illustrates how we intend to use K-capability. Proof: If Task = O(f' 1 ; : : :; ' k g) then there exists an SKBP Pg with knowledge conditions K' 1 ; : : :; K' k that performs Task. It follows from Lemma A.1 (see Appendix A) that Pg has a good implementation from I. Since Pg performs Task and I is t 0 -consistent with Task, by de nition, any good implementation of Pg 
Control Variables and Learning
The concepts developed in the previous sections form the core of an approach to the analysis of information aspects of tasks. There are a number of extensions that add to the exibility and power of this approach. Here, we examine two such extensions: (1) adding exibility to SKBPs through the use of control variables and (2) relaxing knowledge attainment requirements to allow for learning.
Using Control Variables
Suppose that I want to paint my wall green, but I have at my disposal only blue and yellow paint. Intuitively, I should rst paint the wall blue, and then paint it yellow. That is, we should execute a program like while K(wall is not blue) apply blue paint; while K(wall is not green) apply yellow paint.
Unfortunately, this is not an SKBP. Nor is there any obvious way to implement the sequential control embodied by this program using SKBPs as we have de ned them. As most programmers know, constructs such as while and sequential execution are often implemented using a number of control variables, or program counters, which control program execution (although most programmers are not|and should not be!|concerned with the implementation details). In their present form, skeletal knowledge-based programs do not support such convenient and natural constructs. This stems from our insistence that the interpretation function depend only on the con guration. No tests on control variables can appear in the SKBP, because the value of a control variable does not depend on the con guration. Moreover, an SKBP cannot perform the action of setting the value of a control variable, because such an action is not a transition. This renders SKBPs limited in their ability to describe constructs such as sequential execution. There are several solutions for this problem. One approach, which we formalize here, is to allow for additional control bits. An SKBP extended to allow control bits would also need to allow tests on the values of the control bits, and actions that change the value of the bits. We could similarly allow (program) counters (which could take arbitrary nonnegative integer values, not just the values 0 and 1), tests on the value of the program counter, and increment and decrement operations. Additional data structures could also be allowed; whatever choice is made, it is important to specify the additional tests and actions that are allowed.
We can easily describe the program above using an SKBP with one control bit (i.e.,, Boolean variable) b, which we assume is initially 0 (false). Roughly speaking, it would simply be if K(:b^wall is not blue) then apply blue paint; if K(:b^wall is blue) then b := 1; if K(b^wall is not green) then apply yellow paint.
We formalize the addition of control bits to SKBPs as follows. An m-bit system is a system in which the local state of the agent is made up of two disjoint components: an element of an arbitrary set L of local states (corresponding to our standard concept of a It is now straightforward to generalize the notions of \implementation", \good implementation", \can execute", and \can perform Task" to m-bit SKBP. There is one minor subtlety. 
Learning
If Task is O(' 1 ; : : :; ' k ), we know that there is an SKBP that performs Task using only the tests K' 1 ; : : :; K' k . Hence, if an agent always knows one of ' 1 ; : : :; ' k , it can perform Task; this is the essence of Theorem 3.17. In practice, however, it may be unreasonable to expect that we can build an agent that always knows one of ' 1 ; : : :; ' k . For example, suppose our agent must assemble some device which requires using a wrench. A high-level protocol for this task would probably call for knowledge of the location of this wrench. The agent may not always know this location. However, it can always learn it by examining the contents of the tool box and the drawer. More generally, although the agent may not always know one of ' 1 ; : : : ; ' k , it may be able to learn one of these formulas.
This example suggests a useful methodology for designing agents: First, try to understand the knowledge requirements of the task. Then, see if you can build an agent that can learn these requirements. Roughly, we say that an agent can learn f' 1 ; : : : ; ' k g if it can execute a learning protocol that terminates with the agent knowing one of these formulas. For technical reasons, we require the learning program to have no side e ects on the environment, so that if the agent begins execution of the learning program in con guration c, it ends in the same con guration (although the con guration may change during the execution of the learning program).
De nition 4.6: Agent A = hL;Actionsi can learn f' 1 ; : : : ; ' k g in I I; A] if there exist a set L T L and a protocol P for A such that for all runs r of P, there exists some m 2 N such that (1) proj con g (r(m)) = proj con g (r(0)); (2) proj local (r(m)) 2 L T ; (3) I I; A];r;m j = K' 1 _:::_K' k ; (4) for all m 0 < m, we have that proj local (r(m 0 )) 6 2 L T . Let P(c;l) = f(c;l 0 ) : l 0 2 L T and there exists a run r of P and time m such that r(0) = (c; l), r(m) = (c; l 0 ), and for all m 0 < m we have proj local (r(m 0 )) 6 2 L T g. Hence, in order to be able to learn f' 1 ; : : :; ' k g in I I; A], agent A needs a learning program P and a termination condition such that (1) any execution of P eventually terminates, and (2) upon termination A knows one of f' 1 ; : : : ; ' k g and the environment is restored to its initial con guration.
It may seem that if knowledge of one of ' 1 ; : : :; ' k su ces to perform Task, and agent A can always learn one of these formulas, then A will be able to perform Task. Unfortunately, this is not always the case. For example, consider a task that requires reaching some goal con guration in a bounded period of time. We may have an SKBP for performing this task that requires knowledge of one of ' 1 ; : : : ; ' k at each point in time, but if we employ lengthy subroutines to learn these formulas, we may not be able to meet the time constraints of the task. However, when the task is exible in terms of execution time, we can combine the learning subroutines with the main protocol.
De nition 4.7: Task is said to be elastic if for every C 1 and C 2 (where C 1 is a nite sequence of con gurations and C 2 is a C-history) such that C 1 C 2 2 Task, it is the case that : : :
if K n then n ; else learn one of K 1 ; : : :; K n ; This is a special class of SKBPs in which not all conditions are positive. In general, we believe that negative conditions play precisely this role, acting as learning subroutines. The concepts introduced so far, together with results such as Theorems 3.17,4.5, and 4.8, suggest the following methodology for task and agent analysis: (1) Characterize the knowledge complexity of a task; (2) Characterize the knowledge capabilities of the agent; (3) Understand what the agent is capable of learning; (4) Combine these results to understand whether an agent can perform the task. In addition, answers to the rst question provide necessary insight for the design of agents capable of performing a particular task. We illustrate these ideas in the following example.
Example 4.9: We examine the problem of maze searching. This domain, which has received considerable attention in the past (e.g., Bud75, BK78]), allows us to illustrate the use of our formal language in a nontrivial application. More importantly, we shall show that existing work in this area, due to Blum and Kozen BK78], can be best understood as performing a knowledge-complexity analysis of this domain that naturally ts within the above methodology. This perspective was not explicitly taken by the original work. The rst author to adopt such an information-analytic perspective of Blum and Kozen's results was Donald Don94] , in the context of his theory of information invariants. This work, in turn, led us to attempt to provide a general language and methodology, based on the concept of knowledge, for capturing such information complexity analysis.
A maze is a nite, two-dimensional, obstructed checkerboard (see Figure 2 ). To search a maze, a robot, started on any cell, must eventually visit every reachable cell without passing through any of the obstacles. At each time step, the robot can move one unit in any one of the directions north, east, south, or west, as long as the target cell is not part of an obstacle. Budach Bud75] has shown that a nite-state robot cannot search all mazes. Later, Blum and Kozen showed that two nite-state robots can search all mazes, and that a single robot with a counter can search all mazes as well. We shall show that Blum and Kozen's work can be interpreted as characterizing the knowledge complexity of maze-searching for agents and the knowledge capabilities of a number of agents.
In this domain, the con guration space consists of pairs of the form (maze, non-obstructed cell of that particular maze). Each such state can be a possible initial state, i.e., the robot may start at any cell in any maze. The physical capabilities of the robot are such that it can move to any non-obstructed cell to its immediate north, east, south, or west.
The task description corresponds to the set of trajectories in which all non-obstructed cells within the maze are visited. That is, the robot is thrown into some random cell in some random nite maze and must visit all non-obstructed cells in this maze. Clearly, this is an elastic task.
Assume that the language contains the following propositions: b-north, b-east, b-south, b-west, Green, and GREEN. A state satis es b-north, b-east, b-south, or b-west when the adjacent north=east=south=west cell is obstructed. A state satis es the proposition Green when one or more of the four vertices of the cell is green. A vertex is green if it is the unique point (x 0 ; y 0 ) of some boundary BDRY (i.e., either the boundary of the whole maze or the boundary of one of the obstacles) such that for all (x; y) 2 BDRY, y 0 y or (y 0 = y & x 0 x)]. In particular, if this unique point lies at the southwest corner of the cell, GREEN is satis ed (see Figure 3) .
Blum and Kozen prove that a robot with an in nite counter that always knows the value of the propositions b-north, b-east, b-south, and b-west can search all nite mazes. What is interesting from our perspective is the manner in which this result is proved.
First, we can conclude from Blum and Kozen's work that maze searching is O 3 (CON(fGREEN; Green; b-north; b-east; b-south; b-westg);
where CON(f 1 ; : : :; k g) consists of all the formulas of the form 1^: : :^ k , where i is either i or : i . That is, any robot that always knows the value of the propositions GREEN; Green; b-north; b-east; b-south; b-west can search all nite mazes. In fact, Blum and Kozen provide a conditional plan for searching all nite mazes in which the only conditions refer to the value of these propositions. Control of execution of this plan requires no more than three extra bits.
Blum
Related Work
We have attempted here to unify work on knowledge in multi-agent systems in the distributed systems community with work on information and sensing in the robotics community. As we mentioned earlier, we were particularly in uenced by the earlier work of Donald Don94] and Erdmann Erd94] on the robotics side, and the work of Fagin et al. FHMV95] on the distributed systems side. We brie y discuss the connection between our results and related work in this section.
Erdmann's Abstract Sensors
In Erd94], Erdmann argues that the role of sensors is to provide su cient information to choose \good" actions, and that they should be constructed to ful ll this task. An action is good if it makes progress towards attaining the goal state according to some progress measure. Hence, given a progress measure, we can assess the sensing requirements of a task by examining which actions make progress in which states. Erdmann shows how we can obtain a progress measure for a task from an algorithm for that task.
Erdmann's description of sensors is abstract, given in terms of the sets of states they can distinguish between. Formulas, too, are given semantics in terms of the set of states in which they hold. An abstract sensor is a sensor that tells the agent that it is within some set S. This is naturally captured by our concept of knowledge: if S is the set of states in which ' holds then we can say that, given the sensor reading, the agent knows '. Hence, we see that the semantics of Erdmann's abstract sensors is closely related to the semantics of knowledge.
Our work can be viewed as formalizing some of Erdmann's ideas using the concept of knowledge. While we have added new concepts to those discussed by Erdmann, it would have been possible to develop essentially similar ideas using a purely set-theoretic framework, as in Erdmann's work.
Donald's Capability Classes
erent capability classes. This work motivated many of the questions we are concerned with, leading us to adopt a more \complexity-theoretic" approach, as well as our notion of K-capability.
There are, however, signi cant di erences between Donald's framework and our framework. In its aim and its semantics, our work is much closer to Erdmann's work. Like Erdmann, we emphasize the sensing requirements of tasks. Donald, on the other hand, emphasizes the sensing capabilities of system. Donald's notion of capability of systems is more detailed than our notion of K-capability, and its de nition is less abstract and more geometric. Because his concepts are de ned with respect to a lower, more detailed system description than ours, many of them have no analogues in our framework.
Knowledge in Multi-Agent Systems
Logics of knowledge were introduced into the study of distributed systems by Halpern and Moses HM90] and into arti cial intelligence by Moore Moo85] and Rosenschein Ros85] . The semantics of knowledge we have adopted is based on HM90, Ros85], but much of the formal development, e.g., the concepts of runs, systems, and knowledge-based programs is essentially taken from FHMV95], although there are some di erences, as we discussed earlier.
Previous work in distributed systems has used knowledge as a tool for analyzing and reasoning about the information requirements of tasks. Lower bounds on the information requirements of certain basic tasks in distributed systems have also been established. For example, as we mentioned earlier, Halpern and Moses HM90] show that common knowledge is required to perform coordinated attack and that it cannot be attained in many systems of interest. Chandy and Misra CM86] consider a system of n processors in which the property of mutual exclusion with respect to some critical section is maintained, and show that under certain assumptions on this system, a process must have certain knowledge when it enters the critical section. Then they establish a lower bound on the number of messages that must be sent for this knowledge to be attained. Consequently, one can deduce that at least this number of messages must be passed among processors if the critical section is to be maintained. These results provide important motivation for the approach we have taken to the analysis of tasks.
Knowledge, Actions, and Plans
Epistemic logic has played an important role in formalizing the process of planning under uncertainty. Most notably, the work of Moore Moo85] and Morgenstern Mor87] is concerned with supplying appropriately expressive knowledge representation tools for agents that must reason about their knowledge in the course of their planning activities. Such work considers the issue of knowledge preconditions for plans and the conditions under which an agent knows how to perform an action (where that last term is quite broadly de ned). While there are many similarities between these concerns and the concerns of our paper, they di er in terms of their goal and viewpoint. Whereas Moore and Morgenstern are concerned with formalizing the task of planning from the perspective of the agent, we are concerned with supplying tools to designers of agents. Hence, their perspective is internal, taking the point of view of the planning agent, and our perspective is external, taking the point of view of an external analyst or designer. With these distinct objectives come di erent assumptions. We assume that our designer has an accurate model of the domain and of the robot's actuators. The designer's task is to choose appropriate sensors and software that will allow the robot to perform its tasks. She is not constrained to have some particular amount of knowledge; rather, she will attempt to discover the amount of knowledge needed for performing the task. Moore and Morgenstern, on the other hand, consider planning agents who lack knowledge of the precise e ects of their actions and may need to actively plan in order to learn this information. Having taken the design perspective and relying on an accurate model of the domain, the need for greater expressive power and realistic modeling of the agent's knowledge that motivates some of the developments of Moore and of Morgenstern is less of an issue for us.
Future Work
We have shown how formal measures of informational complexity and capability can be used to analyze robotic systems. We have only scratched the surface here. There are a number of interesting issues that are worth exploring further. We brie y list a few of them here:
We have focused on the problems where we can discuss what must be known at every step of the computation. As we mentioned earlier, there are times when we are interested only in what must be known eventually. It would be of great interest to extend our notions of knowledge complexity and knowledge capability so that they can deal with this. Notice that, among other things, this would mean extending our notions so that we can use a richer language, involving temporal connectives, to express complexity and capability. The notion of K-complexity di ers from those of time and space complexity in that Kcomplexity values are not totally ordered. However, there appears to be an interaction between K-complexity on the one hand and time and space complexity on the other. Intuitively, while a robot with minimal knowledge might be able to perform a task, with more knowledge it might be able to perform the task more e ciently in terms of computation time or space. As we have seen, allowing the agent additional control bits can enable the agent to gain knowledge. It would be interesting to understand better the tradeo s between time/space complexity and K-complexity. We have implicitly assumed that an agent can use all the information implicit in its local state. In general, it may be quite di cult for an agent to compute what it knows, as a function of its internal state. For example, there may be a great deal of information encoded in the local state of a vision system. Getting a computational notion of knowledge that deals with this information is an interesting and di cult problem (see the discussion of logical omniscience and algorithmic knowledge in FHMV95]).
Once we allow the agent to learn, we can explore the possibility of knowledge reductions. Roughly speaking, we can say that a set A of propositional formulas is reducible to B if knowing the formulas in B su ces for learning the formulas in A. For example, consider a robot in an obstacle-free maze that can move in any direction. Suppose the robot is equipped with a touch sensor, allowing it to detect if it is adjacent to the boundary. Hence, this robot is K-capable of fSide;:Sideg, where Side is true if the robot is immediately adjacent to the boundary. Suppose the proposition near is true if the robot is one step away from the boundary. The robot is not K-capable of fnear;:nearg, but clearly the robot can learn fnear;:nearg (perhaps with the aid of a few control bits). In this case, we can say that near is K-reducible to fSide;:Sideg.
Using K-reducibility together with learning could enhance our general methodology of designing programs top-down, starting with knowledge and then implementing the knowledge tests.
We are particularly interested in applying our ideas to the problem of task distribution, in which information plays a crucial role. In task distribution, a central controller for the system must be replaced by a set of distributed controllers. In order to succeed, the distributed controllers must have su cient information about the state of the other components of the system as well as about the state of the external world. However, we would like them to have this information with as little additional overhead of communication. shows that the second arm is always required to know whether the rst arm knows g or not. In designing a distributed controller for this system, we must take care to provide such knowledge to the second arm, whether directly, via communication, or indirectly, via some observation. An algorithm for automatically transforming an SKBP for a centrally controlled system to a distributed SKBP was presented in BS95]. While the applicability of this algorithm is still unclear, we hope that pursuing these ideas will lead us to a better understanding of decentralization.
Our approach (as well as Donald's and Erdmann's) holds the capabilities of the robots xed and measures only sensing complexity. However, we would also like to understand whether it is possible to combine our measure of informational complexity with a measure of actuation complexity to obtain a better characterization of the information complexity of tasks and capabilities of robots. More generally, we view our work as continuing a tradition of attempting to understand some basic and di cult issues in the design of situated systems. There seems to be quite a way to go until all the current ideas in this area converge to a single accepted model. We believe that the framework presented here makes some progress towards this goal.
A Proofs We claim that it performs Task, and that, therefore, Task = O(B). In order to prove this claim, it su ces to show that (1) any good implementation of Pg 0 is a good implementation of Pg and (2) there is a good implementations of Pg 0 .
To prove (1), suppose that P is a good implementation of Pg 0 for some agent A = (L; Actions) from some t 0 -consistent I. At each local state l 2 L, agent A performs some action a l that implements some transition f(i) such that (K i ; f(i) ) 2 Pg 0 and I I; A;P];l j = K i . Since E j = i ) ' f(i) , the properties of the K operator guarantee that I I; A;P];l j = K i ) K' f(i) . Thus, at each local state l 2 L, agent A performs some action a l that implements some transition f(i) such that (K' f(i) ; f(i) ) 2 Pg and I I; A;P];l j = K' f(i) . This implies that P is an implementation of Pg from I. To see that P is a good implementation of Pg from I, notice that, since P is a good implementation of The following lemma is used in the proof of Theorem 3.17, and is also of interest in its own right, since it shows an important special case where an implementation is guaranteed to exist. By way of contrast, as shown in FHMV95], there may not be a protocol that represents a given SKBP.
Lemma A.1: If Pg is an SKBP with positive knowledge conditions K' 1 ; : : :; K' k , and A is K-capable of f' 1 ; : : :; ' k g with respect to I, then Pg has a good implementation from I. Proof: Let P = Pg I I;A] . We claim that P is a good implementation of Pg. In order to prove this, we have to show that P(l) Theorem 3.19: Suppose that (1) for all I t 0 -consistent with Task, if agent A is K-capable of f' 1 ; : : :; ' k g with respect to I then A can perform Task from I, and that (2) some agent is Kcapable of f' 1 ; : : :; ' k g from some I t 0 -consistent with Task. Then Task = O(f' 1 ; : : :; ' k g).
Proof: We must nd an SKBP Pg with conditions K' 1 ; : : :; K' k that performs Task. We do this as follows: We rst de ne a particular agent A that can perform Task. We use the program P A it uses to perform Task to de ne the required SKBP Pg. Then we show that any execution of Pg is identical (when projected to E) to an execution of P A . Since P A performs Task, all of its executions are in the task, and hence, we will have shown that all executions of Pg It now follows from assumption (1) that A can perform Task from I A , and there must be a protocol P A for A that performs Task from I A . De ne the SKBP Pg = f(K' i ; ) 2 P : a 2 P A (l i ); i = 1; : : : ; g. We claim that Pg performs Task. In order to prove this, we must show that if B is an agent and P B is a good implementation of Pg from some set of initial states I B that is t 0 -consistent with Task, then P B performs Task from I B . Since P B is a good implementation of Pg from I B , we have that I I B ; B;P B ] j = K' 1 _ _ K' k , and that if a 2 P B (l), then there is some j such that (K' j ; a ) 2 P and I I B ; B;P B ]; l j = K' j . Suppose that r is an execution of P B from (c; l) 2 I B , and let C denote the C-history de ned by r (i.e., C = con g (r)). We complete this proof by showing that there is an execution of P A from some global state (c; l 0 ) 2 I A that de nes precisely the same C-history C. This implies that C 2 Task, because P A performs Task. Therefore, we have that P B performs Task from I B .
Let a B 0 ; a B 1 ; : : : be the sequence of actions performed by B along the run r, and let 0 ; 1 ; : : :
be the transitions that a B 0 ; a B 1 ; : : : implement. Let ' i 0 ; ' i 1 ; : : : be a sequence of formulas (each of which belongs to f' 1 ; : : :; ' k g) such that (K' in ; n ) 2 P and C(n) j = ' in . That such formulas exists follows from the fact that P B implements P: By de nition, the action assigned by P B at a state (c; l) implements a transition assigned by P to some knowledge condition K' that holds at (c; l); thus, c j = '.
We de ne r A by taking r A (n) = (C(n); l in ) for all n. Obviously, proj con g (r A ) = proj con g (r).
It remains to show that r A is an execution of P A . In order to prove this we have to show that for all n: (1) r A (n + 1) 2 a n (r A (n)), and (2) a n = P A (l in ) (where a n is the unique action of A implementing n .) Proof of (1): By de nition, (c; l j ) 2 a n (C(n); l in ) i c 2 n (C(n + 1)) and ' j holds at c. But by construction, C(n + 1) 2 n (C(n)) (since this con guration was obtained by applying n to C(n)) and ' i n+1 holds at C(n+1)). Hence, (C(n+1); l i n+1 ) = r A (n+1) 2 a n (C(n); l in ) = a n (r A (n)).
Proof of (2): The action taken at time n by A is the (only) action that implements the transition n that B's action at time n implements. Recall that P was obtained by adding a pair (' j ; m ) whenever a m is assigned to l j . Hence, it must be the case that P A (l in ) = a n , which is what we wanted to show. In order to show that A +(m+1) can perform Task, we must provide a program for it that performs Task. Intuitively, this is done as follows: we describe an agent similar to A that is K-capable of f' 1 ; : : :; ' k g from I. Consequently, we know that this agent has an implementation P of Pg that performs Task from I +m . We let A execute this implementation. However, this implementation is not de ned on all states of A. In particular, it is not de ned on those state in which A does not know any of the conditions f' 1 ; : : : ; ' k g. In those states, we let A learn these conditions. After learning one of these conditions, A will reach a local state on which the given implementation is de ned. Notice that this approach requires A to switch between P and the learning subroutines. Thus, an additional bit is needed to keep track of whether P is being executed or the learning program, and m additional bits are needed to execute P itself; A +(m+1) has these additional bits. Finally, although learning may take a while, because the task is elastic, we do not mind the detours the learning subroutine may cause.
We proceed as follows. Let P L be the protocol for A that learns f' 1 ; : : :; ' k g in I I; A]. Let Notice that A 0 is well de ned, and implements the same transitions that A implements. This follows from the fact that for every global state s in I I; A], it is the case that proj con g P L (s) = proj con g (s). (Here is where we are using the fact that a learning program has no side e ects on the con guration.) Moreover, we know that proj local P L (s) 2 L 0 , since P L is a learning program for A. We have shown that A 0 is K-capable of f' 1 ; : : : ; ' k g. Therefore, A 0 +m has an implementation P 0 of Pg that performs Task from I +m . We de ne a protocol P for A +(m+1) that acts as follows: when the rst bit is 0, it emulates the behavior of P 0 whenever possible. When As should be apparent from its de nition, every execution of P from I +(m+1) corresponds to some execution of P 0 into which some nite subsequences are inserted, corresponding to the (terminating) executions of P L . We know that every execution of P 0 from I +m is in Task and that Task is elastic. We conclude that every execution of P must also be in Task.
